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1. “Welcome, wanderer”:2 Introduction 
 
This chapter argues that a number of the positive aspects of European media policy 
are compromised by its failure to take into account the seriously distorting effects of 
the global oligopolies, built on the back of the copyright monopoly, in the sector of 
media and entertainment production. Part 2 of the chapter considers the articulation of 
an interlocking web of human rights-based objectives in the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive of 2010 in the context of their relationship to the international 
copyright system. The nature of the international copyright system and the obstacles 
that it poses to the realization of these objectives are considered in Parts 3 and 4, 
respectively.  Part 3 focuses on the critical significance of copyright to the so-called 
cultural industries, particularly (but not only) in the form of independent exclusive 
rights granted by the copyright system to investors, such as film producers and 
broadcasters, in the distribution of creative works. It assesses the operation of the 
markets for entertainment products in the light of the monopoly rights enjoyed by 
copyright holders.  The way in which the copyright system, and market that it 
sustains, interacts at the global and local levels with the values expressed in the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive of 2010 is the subject matter of Part 4. 
 
 
2. “If we offend it is with our good will”3: European media policy 
 
European media policy seems to be remarkably well-basted with good intentions. 
European legislation on media regulation, which comprises an important part of this 
complex policy web, is chock-full of references to things that most people would 
consider occupy the moral high ground of the European landscape. This point most 
likely can be demonstrated by multiple references to such instruments, but by way of 
illustration this chapter will confine itself to a discussion of the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive of 2010.
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 In explaining the policy basis for the substantive 
provisions of this directive, its recitals list a range of under-pinning principles that 
include: cultural diversity; freedom of speech, encompassing the freedom to receive 
information especially with respect to events of “high interest” (Recital 55), and the 
relationship of these principles to democracy; the avoidance of dominant positions in 
the market for audiovisual services; the importance of independent production; and, 
support for the production of “European audiovisual fiction films that are addressed to 
an international audience” (Recital 75). This list of the Directive’s values and 
principles, while not comprehensive, is important in the context of this chapter 
because it has particular relevance to the relationship between media policy and 
copyright law and policy. Before considering the copyright dimensions, however, 
some preliminary comments will be made on the contents of the list. 
 
2.1 Cultural diversity 
Of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive’s good intentions, the importance of 
cultural diversity is arguably given pride of place. The concept of cultural diversity is 
mentioned in Recitals 4, 6, 7, 12, 19, and 69 as a value in its own right, as a legal 
principle mandated by Article 167(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), and as a treaty obligation as a result of the EU’s adherence 
to the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions. There is a small technical difference between the nature of the 
obligation under Article 167(4) TFEU, which is focused on the diversity of the 
cultures of European Union, and that under the UNESCO Convention, which cannot 
be understood to be limited to Europe alone. The UNESCO Convention is of 
particular importance here because it is the most developed international legal 
instrument with respect to the concept of cultural diversity. Accordingly, this concept 
can best be illustrated through a brief consideration of the Convention. 
 
Even without the UNESCO Convention, it would be reasonably clear that a discourse 
exists in the instruments of public international law suggesting, at least, the 
valorization of cultural diversity. This discourse can be observed, for example, from 
the composite effect of a range of provisions found in the human rights Covenants to 
the Charter of the United Nations.
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 While these provisions are more properly 
concerned with questions of cultural self-determination, it is clear that this necessarily 
carries with it a concern to preserve diverse cultural identities.  What the UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
of 2005 brought was a more explicit engagement with the concept of cultural 
diversity.
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 While the relationship between the Covenants to the Charter of the United 
Nations and the UNESCO Convention is not made explicit, it is evident from both its 
Preamble and its operative provisions (especially Articles 2.1 and 5.1) that the 
UNESCO Convention firmly lodges itself within the camp of human rights 
conventions, even it does not go so far as to create a new human right.
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In order to lay the groundwork for the analysis in this chapter, it is necessary to put 
some flesh on the bones of the concept of “culture” with which the UNESCO 
convention is concerned. In fact, there is a great deal of flesh to play around with 
here: “culture” being a totalizing concept of enormous potential width and diversity 
(Sider, 1986, p. 6; Blake, 2000, pp. 67-68). The UNESCO Convention attempts to 
give form to the concept of culture with which it is concerned, although it is 
noticeable that its definitions, which are found in Article 4, involve some circularity 
because they all invoke the notion of culture in order to define it. This, possibly 
inevitable, circularity is not the only indication that the drafters of the Convention 
experienced considerable difficulty pinning down the central concept with which they 
were concerned.
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 It is also evident that each attempt at definition gives rise to other 
definitional problems that call for further elucidation (and circularity). Article 4 of the 
Convention defines its central concept of “cultural diversity” as “the manifold ways in 
which cultures and groups and societies find expression”, including “diverse modes of 
artistic creation, production, dissemination, distribution and enjoyment, whatever the 
means and technologies used”. “Cultural content” is “the symbolic meaning, artistic 
dimension, and cultural values that originate from or express cultural identities”. 
“Cultural expressions … result from the creativity of individuals, groups and 
societies, and … have cultural content”. Article 4 also deals with the more concrete 
aspects of cultural expressions. It defines “cultural activities, goods and services” as 
those that “embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective of the commercial 
value they may have”. Cultural activities are, however, distinguished from cultural 
goods and services on the basis that they “may be an end in themselves, or they may 
contribute to the production of cultural goods and services”. The production and 
distribution of these cultural goods and services may be undertaken by “cultural 
industries”. Despite these definitional ambiguities, it is clear that the activities with 
which the Audiovisual Media Services Directive is concerned, namely production and 
distribution of audiovisual media products, falls within the Convention’s notion of 
cultural goods and services distributed by cultural industries. Another thing that seems 
clear is that, from the points of view of both the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive and the UNESCO Convention, cultural diversity is linked to other core 
values like freedom of speech, democracy and creativity. 
 
2.2 Freedom of speech 
Freedom of speech, including freedom to receive information, as a core value is 
mentioned in Recitals 5, 12, 16 and 49 of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. 
Given the interlocking network of human rights based values contained in the Recitals 
generally, and in these Recitals specifically, the concept of freedom of speech in the 
Directive seems to be derived from the argument in favour of free speech focussing 
on its public importance. This theory argues that freedom of speech is essential to the 
preservation of democracy and concerns itself with the interests of speaker and 
audience in both factual material and in opinion (Barendt, 2005, ch. 1). Recital 5, 
which specifically mentions “freedom of information, diversity of opinion and media 
pluralism”, links these concepts to that of democracy. The association between media 
pluralism and the right to information is also found in Recital 12, which puts them 
together with cultural diversity. The invocation of human rights law as a basis for the 
protection of “freedom of the press and freedom of expression in the media” is 
contained in Recital 16, which cites both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, Article 11, and the constitutional rules of EU member states. In 
Recital 49 the protection of the right to information becomes the bed-fellow of 
ensuring “wide access by the public to television coverage of national or non-national 
events of major importance to society”. This general statement is followed up in 
Recital 55, which is concerned with the need for a so-called short extracts rule. A 
short extract from the Recital itself explains that “[i]n order to safeguard the 
fundamental freedom to receive information and to ensure that the interests of viewers 
in the Union are fully and properly protected, those exercising exclusive television 
broadcasting rights to an event of high interest to the public should grant other 
broadcasters the right to use short extracts for the purposes of general news 
programmes on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms taking due account of 
exclusive rights”. 
 
2.3 Avoidance of dominant positions 
Superficially, the justification of free speech based on democratic participation might 
be regarded as implying a particular concern with the ability of the state to constrain 
free speech about its activities. However, it is not too difficult to make the argument 
that the ability of citizens to participate in the democratic or political process can also 
be impeded by powerful so-called “private” interests. Where the socio-economic 
power of such interests is significant their power may be (at least) as relevant to 
constraining such participation as the power of the state. The phenomenon whereby 
private interests, especially media interests, seek to control the outcome of various 
political processes is well known. But other measures of control exercised by private 
interests may have a more insidious effect on the ability of individuals to participate 
in political processes. This argument, linking freedom of speech, democracy and the 
avoidance of dominant market positions, seems to have been accepted in the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive. Recital 5 refers to the importance of media 
pluralism to democracy. More explicitly, Recital 8 notes the importance of avoiding 
“the creation of dominant positions which would lead to restrictions on pluralism and 
freedom of televised information and of the information sector as a whole”. 
 
2.4 Independent production 
The importance of stimulating the independent production sector is another variation 
on the theme of ensuring diversity and plurality, even if the concept of independence 
in this context is not always easy to define.
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 Both Recitals 64 and 68 of the Directive 
refer to the importance of stimulating independent production. Recital 68 also links 
the question of independent production to the value of promoting creativity in the 
sector, which is, as noted above, linked into the whole notion of cultural diversity. 
The Recital reads as follows: 
A commitment, where practicable, to a certain proportion of broadcasts for 
independent productions, created by producers who are independent of 
broadcasters, will stimulate new sources of television production, especially 
the creation of small and medium-sized enterprises. It will offer new 
opportunities and marketing outlets to creative talents, to cultural professions 
and to employees in the cultural field. 
 
2.5 European film-making 
Another of the specific ways in which the Directive envisages offering the 
opportunities, mentioned in Recital 68, “to creative talents, to cultural professions and 
to employees in the cultural field” is, presumably, through support to European audio-
visual production.
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 This objective is mentioned in Recitals 74 and 75. While Recital 
74 is concerned with the question of what Member States should do in this respect, 
Recital 75 focuses on the question of encouraging “[m]edia service providers, 
programme makers, producers, authors and other experts … to develop more detailed 
concepts and strategies aimed at developing European audiovisual fiction films that 
are addressed to an international audience”.  The motivation for this sentiment is not 
stated, but one might infer that it is partly related to economics and the question of 
increasing the international market share of European films. Another possible 
explanation for this sudden interest in the international market, rather than the 
European one, could be related to the importance of protecting and promoting cultural 
diversity in the international film market. 
 
 
3. “So quick bright things come to confusion”11: Copyright 
 
It would be simply wrong to say that despite all its good intentions the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive ignores the fact that audiovisual production and distribution 
takes place in a market that is saturated with the monopoly rights conferred upon 
copyright holders. There are a number of places in the Recitals that make reference, 
sometimes slightly obliquely, to this fact. Probably the most striking, and certainly the 
least oblique, reference to the pervasive effects of copyright appears in Recitals 55 
and 56, and in Articles 14 and 15. These provisions deal with the so-called “short-
extracts rule”, which is designed to protect that aspect of the right to freedom of 
speech that is concerned with the right to receive information. In order to protect this 
“fundamental right”, according to Recital 55, “those exercising exclusive television 
broadcasting rights to an event of high interest to the public should grant other 
broadcasters the right to use short extracts for the purposes of general news 
programmes on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms taking account of 
excusive rights”. The Recital then goes on to mention various conditions to which this 
short extracts rule is subject. Recital 56 makes the relationship of this rule to 
copyright law quite clear by providing that the short extracts rule is without prejudice 
both to Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society and to “the relevant international conventions 
in the field of copyright and neighbouring rights”. However, while the Directive does 
not ignore the existence of copyright law at the national, regional and international 
levels, it does seem that it is oblivious to the significance – and potentially destructive 
effect - of this body of law for a number of its good policy intentions that have been 
discussed above. 
 
The copyright system as it applies in the European Union and its member states is an 
interlocking multi-level affair comprising international treaties, European Union 
directives and the national law of member states. One of the consequences of this is 
that copyright law, like intellectual property law in general, exhibits an unusual 
degree of international harmonization for what is considered to be a private law right. 
The multilateral treaty that is widely regarded as having started the broad-based move 
towards international harmonization is the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works of 1886, which is now largely embedded in the 
international trading system as a consequence of the World Trade Organization 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property (TRIPs Agreement), 
Article 9.1, and therefore in the national law of all WTO member states. International 
harmonization of the protection for the rights of performers, producers of sound 
recordings and broadcasters (so-called related rights) arrived in the form of the Rome 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms & 
Broadcasting Organisations of 1961.
12
 Provisions on the protection of related rights 
are now also included in Article 14 of the TRIPs Agreement. At the European Union 
level there is plethora of directives that address themselves to copyright and related 
rights harmonization.
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 Despite this relatively extensive level of harmonization, there 
are still some differences in copyright protection at member state level. To some 
extent this is a product of the fact that what is now referred to as copyright protection 
in the European Union has evolved from two different systems, the civil law system 
of droit d’auteur and the common law system of copyright (see Ginsburg, 1990). 
Nevertheless, pressure at the international level, which has filtered down through the 
European Union directives, has resulted in a general trend towards the common law 
approach, which is also of course the system that operates under US law. The 
existence of some differences in protection, of both rights’ holders and of users of 
copyright works, in European member states means that some of the arguments that 
follow may have less force in some jurisdictions. However, the assertion in this 
chapter is that the copyright system and the market in which it operates is so 
“internationalized” that, despite some local variations in law, there are general effects 
at the global level which have inevitable consequences at the regional and national 
levels. 
 
Essentially, the international copyright system has operated at least in relation to some 
types of copyright protected “cultural goods and services” as a fetter on things like 
cultural diversity, freedom of speech and creativity. This effect has been produced by 
certain aspects of copyright law itself, allied with aspects of behaviour in the market 
for cultural goods and services. So far as copyright law is concerned the threat that it 
poses to cultural diversity and self-determination is a consequence of the process by 
which it commodifies and instrumentalises the cultural outputs with which it is 
concerned. There are five interdependent aspects of copyright law that have been 
essential to this process. 
 
The first and most basic tool of commodification is the alienability of the copyright 
interest. This is a critical factor in the context of this chapter and arises as a 
consequence of the fact that copyright law operates on the basis of a distinction 
between the author of copyright works and the owner of those works. While the 
author maintains some symbolic significance in copyright law,
14
 the rights conferred 
by copyright are enjoyed by its owners. Sometimes authorship and ownership 
coincide.  Authors of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works are usually the first 
owners of the copyright in those works; and film directors typically have a share of 
the copyright interest.
15
 However, at least in the Anglo-American system, these 
interests can be freely transferred by contract. Thus, it is frequently the case that 
authors of copyright works come under pressure to transfer their copyright to those 
who are making an investment in the distribution of the works, such as publishers, and 
music and film production companies. In other words, it is the practice of the cultural 
industries to take advantage of the alienability of the copyright interest to gather in as 
many copyright interests as they can. Since the transfer of copyright interests is a 
question of contract, the extent to which a publisher or production company will be 
successful in doing this is largely a matter of relative bargaining positions and market 
power. Nevertheless, where this process of “gathering in” is successful, it has the 
consequence of uniting in the same hands the copyright interests in primary creative 
works and the copyright interests already enjoyed by those who invest in the 
distribution of those same works.
16
 
 
A second significant aspect of copyright law making it an important tool of trade and 
investment is its duration. There is much controversy over the question of copyright 
duration, which has increased exponentially over time. The original copyright period 
in the United Kingdom, for example, was 14 years (An Act for the Encouragement of 
Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of 
Such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned of 1710 (Statute of Anne), 8 Anne 
c.19).  Now, all WTO members are required to have a minimum period of copyright 
protection for literary and artistic works (including films) consisting of the life of the 
author of the work plus fifty years (WTO TRIPs Agreement, Arts 9 & 12). The period 
of protection for performers and producers of sound recordings is 50 years, and 20 
years for broadcasters (WTO TRIPs Agreement, Art 14.5). In the European Union, as 
a consequence of the Copyright Term Directive (2006/116/EC), Article 1, copyright 
in literary and artistic works (including films) is for the life of the author plus 70 
years, while related rights last for fifty years (Article 3). In the current context, the 
long period of copyright protection increases the asset value of individual copyright 
interests (Towse, 1999) and makes it a very useful tool in the orchestration of global 
entertainment oligopolies, which are further discussed below. The market for filmed 
entertainment provides a particularly good example of this. In this market the 
copyright monopoly, allied with the vertical integration of the market, has allowed the 
major media and entertainment corporations to dominate, not only the market for first 
run cinema, but also the markets that have been created as a consequence of the 
development of new technologies for the distribution of filmed entertainment. That is, 
the same oligopolistic market structure controls the market for television feature 
films, cable transmission of films, videos, DVDs and their various technological 
successors (Bettig, 1996, pp.39-42). 
 
Thirdly, copyright’s horizontal expansion means that it is progressively covering 
more and more types of cultural production. The origins of copyright lie in the 
protection of printed works.  Arguably, the precursor of modern copyright systems 
was the fifteenth century Venetian system of printing privileges (Stapleton, 2002, ch. 
2), which was apparently agnostic on the question of what was printed, protecting 
both written works and images provided that they were reproducible through the 
new(ish) technique of printing (Landau & Parshall, 1994). The famous English 
Statute of Anne, to which reference has been made above, was even more limited as it 
functioned essentially for protection of printed literary works. In the interim, however, 
and with the creeping certainty of a cultural harvester, copyright has gathered more 
and more forms of cultural and creative output into its silo. It is now difficult to think 
of any creative, cultural or scholarly work constituting a discrete product that is not 
subject to copyright interests. More than this, copyright (and/or related rights) are also 
granted to those who make investments in the distribution of these works. The 
particular significance of this point, discussed further below, is that this horizontal 
expansion of the range of works over which copyright is granted augments the power 
of the entertainment industry oligopolies by allowing them to dominate the market 
across a wide range of cultural outputs. 
 
Fourthly, the strong commercial distribution rights have put copyright owners in a 
particularly strong market position, especially in the global context. This is of course 
another manifestation of the expansionist tendencies of copyright law, which are 
evident not just in relation to duration and scope, as argued above, but also in relation 
to range of exclusive rights granted to copyright holders. As the name suggests, 
copyright was originally a right against copying. Now both treaties at the international 
level
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 and the European Union Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society have expanded the exclusive right to copy into a general right to 
control reproduction; and they have added other exclusive rights in relation to things 
like communication to the public, making copyright works available to the public, and 
commercial distribution. As the discussion below seeks to demonstrate, the ability to 
control international and national markets - including the ability to carve up the 
international market along national lines and manipulate the availability of copyright 
works in different states (Macmillan, 1998) -  is critically dependent on this saturating 
level of control. 
 
Lastly, the power of the owners of copyright in relation to all those wishing to use 
copyright material has been bolstered by a contraction of some of the most significant 
user rights in relation to copyright works, in particular fair dealing/fair use and public 
interest rights. This has been accompanied by significant shifts in rhetoric. Not only 
have the monopoly privileges of intellectual property owners become “rights”, user 
rights have become “defences” or “exceptions”. Thus “users” are protected by 
“exceptions” to “rights”. Nothing could better encapsulate their current vulnerability. 
It is also of particular interest to note in this respect that while the Directive on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society makes the introduction of a 
broad range of exclusive rights for copyright owners obligatory, it leaves the 
introduction of most types of known “exceptions and limitations” at the discretion of 
the members states subject to constraints on the width of such “exceptions and 
limitations” (Art 5).  The TRIPs Agreement also constrains the scope of its 
“limitations and exceptions through its (in)famous three step test (Art 13).18  Finally, 
allied to these characteristics of copyright law is the development of associated rights, 
in particular, the right to prevent measures designed to circumvent technological 
protection,
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 which has no fair dealing type exceptions and which, as we know now, is 
capable of a quite repressive application.
20
 
 
Viewed in isolation from the market conditions that characterise the cultural 
industries, copyright’s commodification of cultural output might appear, not only 
benign, but justified by both the need for creators to be remunerated in order to 
encourage them to create
21
 and the need for cultural works to be disseminated in order 
to reap the social benefits of their creation.
22
 However, viewed in context the picture 
is somewhat different. Copyright law has contributed to, augmented, or created a 
range of market features that have resulted in a high degree of global concentration in 
the ownership of intellectual property in cultural goods and services. Five such market 
features, in particular, stand out. First, is the internationally harmonized nature of the 
relevant intellectual property rights.
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 This dovetails nicely with the second dominant 
market feature, which is the multinational operation of the corporate actors who 
acquire these harmonized intellectual property rights while at the same time 
exploiting the boundaries of national law to partition and control markets. The third 
relevant feature of the market is the high degree of horizontal and vertical integration 
that characterises these corporations. Their horizontal integration gives them control 
over a range of different types of cultural products. Their vertical integration allows 
them to control distribution, thanks to the strong distribution rights conferred on them 
by copyright law (Macmillan, 2002a). The fourth feature is the progressive integration 
in the ownership of rights over content and the ownership of rights over content-
carrying technology. Finally, there is the ever increasing tendency since the 1970s for 
acquisition and merger in the global market for cultural products and services (Bettig, 
1996, pp.37ff; Smiers, 2002). Besides being driven by the regular desires (both 
corporate and individual) for capital accumulation (Bettig, 1996, p. 37), this last 
feature has been produced by the movements towards horizontal and vertical 
integration, and integration of the ownership of rights over content and content-
carrying technology (Macmillan, 2006). 
 
 
4. “It seems to me/That yet we sleep, we dream”24 
 
As will be immediately evident this state of affairs has a number of implications for 
things like the protection of cultural diversity and freedom of speech, the avoidance of 
dominant positions, the stimulation of independent audiovisual production and 
European feature film production. 
 
4.1 Cultural Diversity and Freedom of Speech 
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Diversity has 
nothing much to say about copyright law or the effects of the copyright system on the 
concept of the cultural diversity with which it is concerned. While the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive is a little more forthcoming on this question, to a certain 
extent it shares the selective blindness of the UNESCO Convention to which it has so 
firmly hitched its wagon. 
 
It seems strange that the UNESCO Convention is so unconcerned with copyright.  
The interest manifested by the Convention in the production of cultural goods and 
services by cultural industries suggests a clear, if unarticulated, link with copyright 
law. While it is clear that copyright would not apply to the full range of cultural 
expressions and activities with which the Convention is concerned, there is a 
reasonably marked overlap between those things that would appear to fall within the 
definition of cultural goods and services in the Convention and the range of works 
protected by copyright law. As is envisaged in the Convention, this also raises the 
question of the role of the cultural industries in the copyright arena. Of course, the 
cultural industries are not involved in the production of all the cultural goods and 
services protected by copyright. Indeed, on the creative side much production is done 
by individuals or groups that would hardly feel comfortable with the sobriquet 
“cultural industry”.25 On the other hand, there are some copyright cultural goods and 
services that are more obviously the product of the cultural industries, the clearest 
example of these being films and broadcasts, which rely on the collaboration of a 
wide range of creative activities under the auspices of a “cultural industry”. Even 
where the cultural industries cannot be said to be involved in the production of 
copyright goods and services, they have a clear role in their distribution. These roles 
of the cultural industries in the production and distribution of certain types of cultural 
goods and services are subject to generous protection by copyright law. This 
protection sits alongside, often uncomfortably, the protection that copyright offers to 
individual creators. The ensuing tension between creative or cultural interests and 
business interests lies at the heart of copyright’s relationship with the concept of 
cultural diversity. 
 
The consequences of the copyright facilitated aggregation of private power over 
cultural goods and services on the global level are, from a cultural diversity 
perspective, not happy ones. Through their control of markets for cultural products the 
multimedia corporations have acquired the power to act as a cultural filter, controlling 
to some extent what we can see, hear and read (Capling, 1996; Abel, 1994a, p. 52; 
Abel 1994b, esp. p. 380). Closely associated with this filtering power is the tendency 
towards homogeneity in the character of available cultural products and services 
(Bettig, 1996). It makes good commercial sense in a globalized world to train taste 
along certain reliable routes, and the market for cultural goods and services is no 
different in this respect to any other (Levitt, 1983).
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 Of course, there is a vast market 
for cultural goods and services and, as a consequence, the volume of production is 
immense. However, it would obviously be a serious mistake to confuse volume with 
diversity. 
 
Finally, cultural diversity is also adversely affected by copyright’s constriction of 
what has been described as the intellectual commons or the intellectual public 
domain,
27
 in which creativity, essential to cultural diversity, is said to flourish 
(Macmillan, 2010). The impact on the intellectual commons manifests itself in 
various ways. For example, private control over a wide range of cultural goods and 
services has an adverse impact on freedom of speech (Macmillan, 1996; Macmillan, 
2005). The ability to control speech, arguably objectionable in its own right (Barendt, 
2005), facilitates a form of cultural domination by private interests. This may, for 
example, take the subtle form of control exercised over the way we construct images 
of our society and ourselves.
28
 But this subtle form of control is reinforced by the 
industry’s overt and aggressive assertion of control over the use of material assumed 
by most people to be in the intellectual commons and, thus, in the public domain. The 
irony is that the reason people assume such material to be in the commons is that the 
copyright owners have force-fed it to us as receivers of the mass culture disseminated 
by the mass media. The more powerful the copyright owner the more dominant the 
cultural image, but the more likely that the copyright owner will seek to protect the 
cultural power of the image through copyright enforcement. The result is that not only 
are individuals not able to use, develop or reflect upon dominant cultural images, they 
are also unable to challenge them by subverting them.
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 These constrictions of the 
intellectual commons (or public domain) affect its vibrancy and creative potential. As 
Waldron comments, “[t]he private appropriation of the public realm of cultural 
artifacts restricts and controls the moves that can be made therein by the rest of us” 
(Waldron, 1993, p. 885). 
 
Coombe describes this corporate control of the commons as monological and, 
accordingly, destroying the dialogical relationship between the individual and society: 
Culture is not embedded in abstract concepts that we internalize, but in 
the materiality of signs and texts over which we struggle and the 
imprint of those struggles in consciousness.  This ongoing negotiation 
and struggle over meaning is the essence of dialogic practice.  Many 
interpretations of intellectual property laws quash dialogue by 
affirming the power of corporate actors to monologically control 
meaning by appealing to an abstract concept of property.  Laws of 
intellectual property privilege monologic forms against dialogic 
practice and create significant power differentials between social actors 
engaged in hegemonic struggle.  If both subjective and objective 
realities are constituted culturally – through signifying forms to which 
we give meaning – then we must critically consider the relationship 
between law, culture, and the politics of commodifying cultural forms. 
(Coombe, 1998, p. 86) 
Some remnants of a dialogical relationship ought to be preserved by copyright’s fair 
dealing/fair use right. It is, after all, this aspect of copyright law that appears to be 
intended to permit resistance and critique (Gaines, 1991, p. 10). Yet the fair dealing 
defence is a weak tool for this purpose and becoming weaker (Macmillan, 2006). 
 
Overall, there are good reasons for suspecting that the copyright system poses a 
serious threat to cultural diversity and freedom of speech in the cultural goods and 
services sector, generally, and there is no reason to think that this observation would 
not hold good specifically in its audiovisual sub-sector. Given that many of the 
potentially negative effects of the international copyright system on cultural diversity 
and freedom of speech are a consequence of the establishment of positions of 
dominance, a point which is clearly recognised by the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive, the extent to which the Directive’s commitment to the avoidance of 
dominant positions ameliorates the situation is now considered. 
 
4.2 Avoidance of dominant positions 
Avoiding the creation of dominant positions is, as noted in paragraph 2.3 above, 
critical in any case to securing cultural diversity and freedom of speech. The 
particular problem that copyright creates is that its tendency is to promote the creation 
of dominant positions. Therefore taking account of the problem posed by the 
copyright system is essential. Otherwise the protection of cultural diversity and free 
speech really will just be a dream. While it might be argued that the short extracts rule 
(Recitals 55 and 56, and Articles 14 and 15) is aimed at addressing one of the 
potential consequences of dominance, the Directive is otherwise bereft of many ideas 
on how this might be done and certainly does not seem to face up to the impact of the 
copyright system in this area. Recital 8 states that “[i]t is essential for the Member 
States to ensure the prevention of any acts … which may promote the creation of 
dominant positions which would lead to restrictions on pluralism and freedom of 
televised information and of the information sector as a whole”. So far as dominance 
arising from the operation of the copyright system is concerned, Recital 8 has the 
distinct air of someone shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. There are, 
effectively, two problems here. One is that EU Member States have not managed to 
control copyright created dominance. The other is that, even if they had, they would 
still be faced by the problem that Europe – in this respect – is not a fortress. The 
distortions that are caused by copyright created dominance operate internationally, 
and not just in the European market for audiovisual services. In fact, in a copyright 
saturated sector, the avoidance of dominance almost sounds like an oxymoron. 
 
A reasonable response to the argument in the paragraph above might be that there are 
other devices in the EU legal arsenal for dealing with the problem of dominance. For 
example, in the famous joined cases of Football Association Premier League v QC 
Leisure and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd
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 the European Court of 
Justice held that copyright holders were not entitled to rely on their copyright interests 
to partition national markets for televised broadcasts of sporting events because such 
behaviour would amount to an impairment of the freedom to provide services under 
Article 56 of the EU Treaty and is not justified on the basis that it is necessary to 
protect the specific subject matter of the copyright in live football transmissions. The 
Advocate General, in an opinion with which the European Court of Justice agreed, 
noted that this type of impairment of the freedom to provide services not only affects 
live transmissions of sporting events but also the sale of things like computer 
software, musical works, e-books and films via the Internet. The decision clearly has 
some constraining effect on the way in which copyright holders exercise their power, 
particularly since the European Court of Justice also held that that the series of 
exclusive licences for transmission of the events in question, each for the territory of 
one member state, which precluded competition between member states, breached the 
EU Treaty rules on competition. However, the weight of the decision is clearly 
focussed on activities that partition the European market and so only addressed to 
abuse of dominance in this circumstance. One is left wondering about the extent to 
which this sort of approach can really make much impact on a global system of 
copyright-created dominance, the effects of which are liberally felt in the European 
Union, as in the rest of the world. 
 
4.3 Independent production 
The independent production sector is critical to the policy objectives of the 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive. Independent production, and the media 
plurality that comes with it, is vital to cultural diversity and extremely important in 
ensuring free speech. Stimulating independent production is an antidote to dominance. 
However, the sting in the tail here is that like all these other things, with which it is so 
closely associated, independent production is seriously threatened by the copyright 
induced dominance of the major international players in the audiovisual services 
sector. The tendency, in a copyright dominated world, towards the suppression of 
independent film production is part and parcel of the general tendency towards 
suppression of diversity and cultural filtering, which has already been noted in 
paragraph 4.1. The control over film distribution that is enjoyed by the major media 
and entertainment corporations means that these corporations can control to some 
extent what films are made, what films we can see, and our perception of what films 
there are for us to see. The expense involved in film production and distribution mean 
that without access to the deep pockets of the majors and their vertically integrated 
distribution networks, it is difficult, but not impossible, to finance independent film-
making and distribution. This, naturally, reduces the volume of independent film-
making. The high degree of vertical integration that characterises the film industry, 
especially the ownership of cinema chains, means that many independent films that 
are made find it difficult to make any impact on the film-going public. This is mainly 
because we don’t know they exist. The control by the media and entertainment 
corporations of the films that are made is also a consequence of their habit of buying 
the film rights attached to the copyright in novels, plays, biographies and so on. There 
is no obligation on the film corporations to use these rights once they have acquired 
them but, of course, no-one else can do so without their permission. Similarly, the 
film corporations may choose not to release certain films in which they own the 
exclusive distribution rights or only to release certain films in certain jurisdictions or 
through certain media.
31
 
 
4.4 European film-making 
It is unclear where this state of affairs might leave the stated objective of encouraging 
the production of “European audiovisual fiction films that are addressed to an 
international audience” (Recital 75). The issue of US dominance of the international 
market for “fiction films” has long been a running sore in Europe, particularly in 
certain of its constituent parts (Grantham, 2000; De Valck, 2007, esp. chs. 1 & 2). The 
European enthusiasm for the UNESCO Convention on the Promotion and Protection 
of Cultural Diversity was motivated by an attempt to compensate for the fact that, 
consistently with the US negotiating position, the WTO agreements contain no 
general cultural exception (Graber, 2006). As is well-known, European discontent on 
this matter was focussed on its consequences for the European, especially French, 
film production sector (Grantham, 2000, Part 2). However, cultural concerns about 
US dominance in the film (and audiovisual) production sector and the potential of the 
WTO agreements to sustain this are widespread. As Dunkley remarks: 
In a world where even culture and entertainment are commodified and mass-
marketed, free trade in these sectors is likely to mean that only countries 
possessing comparative advantage can have the privilege of retaining their 
national identities, which in my view is socially outrageous and should be 
resisted. (Dunkley, 2001, pp. 184-185) 
 
There continues to be much concern (outside the US) that the sort of devices that 
governments may wish to employ in order to ameliorate the effects of the 
oligopolistic market for cultural goods and services, including film production, run 
the risk of falling foul of WTO rules. So far as film production (and audio-visual 
production, in general) is concerned, the Agreement which has the capacity to be the 
particular culprit is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
32
 Due to the 
somewhat unusual nature of the GATS as a bottom-up liberalising agreement, WTO 
members are only bound by the liberalising provisions of GATS if, and to the extent 
that, they have accepted obligations in the relevant sector.
33
 There is not yet any 
general agreement or protocol on liberalization of obligations in the audio-visual 
sector,
34
 which is the sector in which the cultural effects of the copyright-induced 
oligopolies are most keenly experienced (Dunkley, 2001, pp. 183-187; Macmillan, 
2002b; Macmillan, 2006; Grantham, 2000). However, some WTO members have 
undertaken relevant obligations and there is considerable international political 
pressure for more liberalization in this sector (Graber, 2006, pp. 569-570; Dunkley, 
2001; Grantham, 2000; Hahn, 2006, p. 526). In the European Union, the effect of the 
coming into force of the UNESCO Convention has been to harden political resistance 
to undertaking liberalization obligations in sectors such as film production. This 
position is explicitly embraced in Recital 7 of the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive, referring to various resolutions of the European Parliament on the matter. 
Thus European member states remain relatively free to support European film-
making. However, assuming the expression “addressing an international audience” in 
Recital 75 of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive means penetrating the 
international market, the question of how European films can be made to do this in a 
market that is under the control of the copyright-induced oligopolies is left hanging. 
 
 
5. “But what of that?”35 
 
European media policy, when viewed through the lens of its blindness to the global 
effects of the copyright system, starts to resemble random quotations from famous 
literary works. The sentiments are striking and pithy, but the whole story is obscured. 
In this case, the consequence is that many of the good intentions laid out in 
instruments like the Audiovisual Media Services Directive are destined to remain as 
no more than just that. It is important to understand that this state of affairs is not just 
a result of a global system over which the EU has no control. To start off with, EU 
Member States were the founding members of the Berne Convention on the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, upon which the international copyright 
system continues to be based.
36
 They were also all founding members of the WTO 
and, in general, supporters of the TRIPs Agreement. However, importantly, the 
situation is in no way improved, and arguably worsened, by the intellectual property 
maximalist position of the European Union. The Directive on Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society (Directive 2001/29/EU
)
 is characterised by the 
absence of much in the way of serious exceptions to the copyright monopoly; and the 
Directive on Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Directive 2004/48/EU
) 
 
reads the like the midsummer’s night dream of the global media and entertainment 
oligopolies come true. The EU is not some powerless victim of forces beyond its 
control. It is an active participant in the legal architecture that sustains the 
international copyright system. It is here then, at the blind heart of the matter, that the 
EU needs to begin to address the contradiction between its media policy and the 
effects of that system. 
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